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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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1961 | Burma and the Two Chinas

by Virginia Thompson

For the second time in a week (the first occasion was the unanimous resolution of April 18 expressing hope for a quick armistice in Korea) the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (with the abstention of Burma and Nationalist China) acted unanimously on April 22 in condemning the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma and in calling on them to put aside their arms and leave the country or march into internment camps.

This issue had been brought to a head on March 17, when the Burmese government handed a note to the American ambassador at Rangoon calling for the termination by June 30 of the United States aid program, which had begun in September 1950 and at the time of its expiration will have cost the United States \$31 million. Eight days later Burma charged Nationalist China before the United Nations with responsibility for the aggression committed by Kuomintang guerrillas against Burmese territory. No connection between the two actions was officially spelled out, but there is no doubt as to their close relationship.

Actually, the presence of KMT troops in

Burma is of long standing, as is their alleged support by the United States. Burma's drastic moves were probably precipitated by the changed tactics of the local KMT forces and by the policy of the Eisenhower Administration in regard to Formosa, which have had grave repercussions on the Burmese political situation. Burma has so recently emerged from colonial status that it is easy to reawaken its chronic suspicion of Western imperialism and its ever-present fear of a Chinese invasion.

The government of Burmese Premier U Nu is committed to a socialist ideology and to neutrality in foreign policy; it is still beset by multiple revolts; and it urgently needs capital and technicians for the rehabilitation of the country's war-damaged economy. In its weakened condition the government cannot afford to alienate any elements that are not in open revolt against it, and these include an extreme left-wing group—the Burma Workers' and Peasants' party—which is quick to seize on every chance to strengthen Burma's ties with Communist countries and to denounce the Anglo-American bloc.

To carry out this program for a welfare state, Premier Nu has accepted American aid

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and has thus laid himself open to attack as a tool of "the Wall Street warmongers." In countering these charges he has stressed the disinterested nature of American help and his willingness to receive comparable aid from Communist states. Because of Burmese distrust of the military commitments believed to be involved in American aid as offered under the Mutual Security Administration, a new agreement under the Technical Cooperation Administration had to be worked out with the United States in 1952. Each move made by the U Nu government which could be interpreted as aligning Burma with the Western powers—such as its decision to support the United Nations resolution on Korea—has produced a fresh internal crisis and has been followed by propitiatory official gestures toward Peiping and Moscow.

For more than three years the activities in Burma of the remnants of KMT troops—variously estimated at 9,000 or 20,000—who fled from the victorious Communists have prompted attacks upon the government by the conservative and the radical opposition. The conservatives claimed that their presence provided Peiping with a valid excuse for invading Burma, while the radicals asserted that they were being trained and equipped by the United States for the purpose of attacking southern China.

Too weak militarily to eject or intern the KMT troops, Burma tried to neutralize their presence by diplomacy. In December 1949 Burma became the first non-Communist country to recognize the Chinese Communist regime, and since that

time it has supported Red China's demand for membership in the UN. Indirectly Rangoon tried to exercise pressure on the KMT government to withdraw its troops from Burma, but Formosa disclaimed responsibility for the activities of General Li Mi, commander of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Burma. The KMT troops simply stayed on in northern Burma, became the *de facto* government in certain areas of the Shan states, lived off the land (to the distress and resentment of the local people), and cornered the region's lucrative opium trade.

Chinese Troops and U. S.

Late in 1951 two unsuccessful attempts by the KMT forces to invade southern China once more aroused Burmese fears and suspicions. A few months later the Peiping radio tried to confirm them by utilizing a visit made by Li Mi to Formosa as a chance to attack the United States for aiding his troops in Burma from bases in Thailand. In the January 1952 session of the UN General Assembly, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Soviet foreign minister, repeated and embellished these charges, which were denied by Bangkok and Washington. High Burmese officials joined in the chorus—with the important difference that they accused, not the United States government, but individual Americans of backing the KMT venture. Not until a year later was a report circulated that the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States was the organization responsible for these activities and that the American ambassador at Rangoon

had resigned in protest against its bungling of the affair.

If the KMT troops had been content with the *status quo*, the Burmese government's policy might again have weathered the storm. But late in 1952 the Chinese Nationalists began expanding their area of operations in Burma. In so doing they deposed the ruler of Mongshu, hoisted the KMT flag over a town they captured, and went so far as to ally themselves informally with some Karen and Mon insurgents—all of which inevitably gave rise to clashes with the Burmese Army. Practical considerations, rather than ideology, seem to have induced them to take this fateful step. Two abortive attacks allegedly made on Yunnan in January 1953 may have permanently discouraged some of the KMT troops from further attempts to re-establish themselves in China and decided them to settle down in Burma. Apparently they gave guns and military training to the Karens and Mons in exchange for food supplies, which the Chinese Nationalists badly needed, and for wolfram, which they were able to sell at a profit.

In Rangoon newspapers reports of American equipment and personnel among the KMT forces in Burma began to appear with increasing frequency. And when the Eisenhower Administration announced that it would withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa, the Burmese concluded that this meant that formal and large-scale American support would now be available to the KMT troops based in Burma. Con-

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Origins of Bricker Amendment

The inception of the Bricker amendment, which reflects a tendency toward isolationism, goes back to 1944. It coincides, ironically, with the American decision, underlined by our participation in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, to sponsor and join the United Nations, which indicated the intention of giving up isolationism once and for all. In political, as well as natural, science any tendency is countered by an opposite tendency. The serious consideration now being given the Bricker amendment by the Senate Judiciary Committee is an interesting example of the phenomenon of counterforce. At the end of World War II, the primary interest of Senators was in strengthening the community relationships of the world through the United Nations, and in 1945 only two Senators voted against the UN Charter. Today apparently the primary concern of Senators is to fortify the sovereignty of the United States, and 64 of them show this by their sponsorship of the Bricker amendment.

Concern Over Supranationalism

The events leading up to the introduction of this amendment on January 7 began in 1944, when the American Bar Association set up a committee to study the proposals for the organization of the nations for peace and law. In 1945 the title of the committee became "The Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations." Soon the committee and the American Bar Association itself grew critical of the UN, especially of its Economic and Social Council.

When the UN in 1949 adopted the Genocide Convention, the Bar Association formally opposed ratification of the convention by the United States on the ground that it represented an intrusion into the domestic jurisdiction of the United States (among other things, seeming to make possible the trial of American citizens before foreign courts for acts committed in the United States). The Bar Association's apprehensions were also aroused by the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This Declaration and the two Covenants subsequently based on it are the chief causes for the Bricker amendment. Sovereignty-conscious Americans were particularly exercised when John P. Humphrey, director of the Division of Human Rights of the United Nations, wrote in the *Annals of the American Academy* of January 1948:

"What is now being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some kind of supranational supervision of . . . relationships between the state and its citizens."

The Bar Association committee was disturbed further by the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Tom C. Clark (supported by two other Justices) last spring, when he defended the right of President Truman to seize the steel mills because, among other reasons, of this country's treaty commitments "for the suppression of acts of aggression"—a commitment which needs steel to make it good.

The lawyers' apprehensions led them to recommend amendment of Article VI of the Constitution—the treaty clause—which states that a treaty is the "supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constiti-

tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The Supreme Court has taken this phraseology literally, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made clear in 1920 in *Missouri vs. Holland*, 252 U.S. 216. John Foster Dulles, now Secretary of State, expressed the view that "supremacy" means "supremacy" indeed in an address of April 12, 1952 in Louisville, Kentucky, when he said: "Treaty law can override the Constitution, and treaties can cut across the rights given to the people by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights."

The Bricker amendment, now before the Senate Judiciary Committee, is the fruit of the concern of the American Bar Association. The intended effect of its six sections is to make treaties subject to the same constitutional restraints that limit the application of statutory law. The amendment also requires congressional legislation corollary to a treaty to make provisions of the treaty applicable as internal law. To prevent Presidents from circumventing the treaty clause, the amendment would make executive agreements subject to the same restrictions as treaties (had such a clause been in effect during World War II, the President would probably have been unable to make the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam agreements). It would end all possibility that the United States could subscribe to the Genocide or Human Rights conventions by its provision that "no treaty shall authorize or permit any international organization to supervise, control or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the United States enu-

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What Should We Do About Bricker Amendment?

ASERIOUS threat to the ability of the United States to survive in the modern world has found its way into the Senate. In these dangerous times when our cities can be destroyed without warning, our nation must more than ever be able to make and fulfill agreements. Yet under the purported guise of protecting our constitutional liberties Senator John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio, has proposed an amendment to our Constitution which threatens our ability to keep the peace and would tangle with red tape our ability to conduct a war should war be forced upon us. Both the Eisenhower and Truman administrations have quite properly taken a vigorous stand against the proposed amendment.

In justice to the 63 Senators who cosponsored this measure with Senator Bricker it must be pointed out that many, if not most, of them joined the Senator from Ohio to encourage study of the subject. Ironically enough, the purported reason for the resolution is already amply covered by the Constitution itself.

As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in opposing curbs on the treaty-making power, told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on April 5, 1953, treaties only rank on an equality with congressional enactments. Thus as a result of further study Mr. Dulles has modified a phrase often quoted from a speech he made as a private citizen in Louisville on April 11, 1952. Mr. Dulles now finds himself in agreement with the Attorney General of the United States, Herbert Brownell, Jr., that treaties cannot alter our Bill of Rights.

But the proponents of the Bricker amendment wrap themselves in self-created doubts on this point and then lash out with an amendment whose principal effect is not directed at the problem they talk about at all.

Blow at World Cooperation

The prohibitions embodied in the amendment strike at the only alternatives we have to nihilistic war today. If Senator Bricker's proposal were to go into the Constitution, the hopefully conceived plans for international control of atomic energy and for disarmament would have to be abandoned. Many facets of these controls would involve matters essentially domestic. And in any event they would at least require supervision and control of atomic production (including rights of private citizens therein) by some international body or foreign power. If we want an international commission to check on Russia's plants and production of atom bombs, we must be constitutionally in a position to grant similar rights to such a commission in our own country.

The Bricker prohibitions would gravely impair our ability to participate in collective measures short of war to curb an aggressor. Under the United Nations Charter the Security Council, subject to our right of veto, has authority to impose embargoes. But since trade almost inevitably involves matters essentially domestic, or the rights of citizens within the United States, we could not under the amendment participate with other nations in economic sanctions even if we wished.

PRESERVE THE TREATY-MAKING POWER

by Dana Converse Backus

Mr. Backus in writing this article on his own responsibility wishes to acknowledge the aid of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in making available to him material it developed in opposition to the Bricker amendment. He is chairman of the Association's Committee on International Law.

In man's long struggle to escape the barbarism of war he has begun to apply the judicial process to disputes between nations. This development, also, Senator Bricker would prohibit as to any matter essentially domestic or affecting the constitutional right of citizens in the United States. Yet adjudication by an international court or commission may be the only avenue of redress for an American citizen. For instance the owners of the Black Tom plant in New Jersey argued their case for damages for its destruction by a saboteur before a mixed German-American Claims Commission. The redress they obtained could have been denied them if Senator Bricker had his way.

Shift from Executive to Congress

Moreover, the Bricker amendment proponents would proceed to undo a decision of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 which was arrived at through hard experience in the day of George Washington. Since Congress cannot fight wars, the President is Commander-in-chief; but under Senator Bricker's proposal American generals in the field could not cooperate in a government with our allies without congressional sanction. And if the cooperation should take the form of agreeing to speed a Canadian division through the United States to meet an attack in the West, it is the intention of certain Senatorial proponents that three steps be required: first a Federal law permitting the President to agree with

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CURTAIL THE TREATY-MAKING POWER

by John W. Bricker

Senator John W. Bricker, Republican of Ohio, is the author of the proposed Bricker amendment to the Constitution.

THE dangers inherent in an unlimited treaty-making power were never more vividly described than by John Foster Dulles, speaking as a private citizen in Louisville, Kentucky, last year. Mr. Dulles at that time warned a meeting of the American Bar Association that "treaty law can override the Constitution," and that treaties "can cut across the rights given the people by the constitutional Bill of Rights."

Mr. Dulles did not exaggerate the danger of an abusive exercise of the treaty power. Two great Justices of the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Charles E. Hughes, had expressed a doubt that any limitation on the treaty power could be implied.

So long as the treaty-making power was confined to its traditional function, the dangers attached to that power might have been regarded as remote. But after the United Nations was formed, the treaty power was put to a revolutionary use. Instead of using treaties to regulate external relationships between sovereign nations, the UN and many of its specialized agencies seized the treaty power as an instrument of legislation on matters of purely domestic concern.

The necessity to compromise incredibly diverse concepts of human rights produced treaties which cannot be reconciled with American constitutional protections. For example, Article 10 of the proposed Human Rights Covenants permits the right to a public trial to be denied in many cases. In the absence of treaty, the Sixth Amendment secures to Americans accused of crimes the right to a

public trial in *all* cases. In addition, the UN proposal for an International Criminal Court would permit American citizens to be tried abroad for crimes committed in the United States. The proposed treaty expressly forbids trial by jury.

Permanent Protection Needed

Secretary of State Dulles agrees in principle with the purpose of Section 1 of my proposed constitutional amendment (S. J. Res. 1). He also agrees in principle with Section 2. That section is designed to prevent any international organization from regulating the purely domestic rights of American citizens or their relationship with their own government. In testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Secretary Dulles made it clear that this Administration would not sign the proposed Human Rights Covenants or any other treaty designed to achieve "internal social reforms" or to control what are "essentially matters of domestic concern."

To those who believe, as I do, that the Administration's new treaty policy is wise, the issue concerning a treaty-control amendment is clear and simple: Why not secure permanent protection against abuse of the treaty power? Why be satisfied with the protection afforded by a purely temporary policy not binding on future administrations?

In my judgment the argument that Section 2 of S. J. Res. 1 would prevent treaty arrangements for the international control of atomic weapons is absurd. The subject matter is clearly international in character. It is fan-

tastic to believe that the Supreme Court would hold such a subject to be "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."

Section 3 of S. J. Res. 1 provides that treaties shall be non-self-executing in their domestic effect. Section 3 does not affect such treaties as the North Atlantic treaty which do not alter domestic law. In addition, many treaties, by their own terms, do not become operative as domestic law until implementing legislation is passed. Regardless of the provisions of a treaty, it is the rule in practically every other country that the treaty does not become internal law until made so by action of the national legislature. In my judgment this rule is sound in principle and workable in practice. Section 3 would give the United States an equality of international treaty obligation which does not now exist in some cases.

Section 4 of the amendment would give the Congress power to regulate the making of executive agreements. Congress is already exercising that power with respect to approximately 85 percent of all executive agreements. Nevertheless, critics of the amendment assert that the President should have unlimited discretion in deciding whether to assume an international obligation in the form of a treaty, an executive agreement approved by Congress, or an executive agreement approved by the President alone.

To say that we should trust the President not to abuse the executive agreement power or that we should trust the President and the Senate not to make any dangerous treaty ignores this warning by Thomas Jefferson in the famous Kentucky Resolution of 1798: "In questions of power, let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."

Backus

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Canada concerning the dispatch of the division; then the agreement; and then a second Federal law to permit the suspension of state laws concerning the carrying of guns without a license. By the time all this was accomplished, the enemy could be at the East coast.

Such would be some of the problems in time of war. In time of peace this radical shift of power from the Executive to the Congress could make impossible one of President Eisenhower's key objectives, the continuation of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program. Congress has authorized the President by executive agreement to negotiate tariff reductions up to a limit, and much has been done to free trade of these impediments. But under the double-take features of the Senator's proposal, it could well be contended that the Collector of Customs in New York was administering a domestic revenue law. Therefore, every trade agreement negotiated under the congressional authorizing act would

have to go back again to Congress for specific approval. The resulting log-rolling would return the country to the worst evils of the old method of fixing tariffs.

Even in the case of treaties Senator Bricker would impose a cumbersome procedure. No treaty could have internal effect unless signed by the President, approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and then supported by a law passed by a majority of the Senate and a majority of the House. Clearly this proposal is aimed at frustration of the sovereign power of the United States to conduct its foreign affairs. No other country in the world engages in such legislative stuttering.

To Senator Bricker's credit there is one proposal which he did not make, but which a majority of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved on the recommendation of its Committee on Peace and Law, over the opposition of its Section on International and Comparative Law. This proposal would reverse the great unifying decision of 1787 and instead provide that no treaty could become effective in any

field where Congress could not legislate in domestic matters. The Bar Association proposal would make it possible for a state in its individual character to frustrate the will of the states in their collective character. Such a result would have rendered unenforceable the human rights provision of the treaty ending the Revolutionary War (1783) protecting the liberty and property of former Tories, and would outlaw many treaties of friendship giving protection to our nationals abroad in return for protection of aliens here.

As Secretary of State Dulles said in opposing the proposal, it would "create a no-man's-land in foreign affairs."

Fortunately, the founding fathers gave our country adequate power in the foreign field. In today's dangerously shrinking world our survival depends on the use of the present carefully balanced powers to deal with others. To hamstring our government with the proposed constitutional changes would be crippling folly. The road to peace must not be made unconstitutional.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



One Bite — or Many?

When Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican leader of the Senate, said in an interview on April 19 that every effort should be made to "settle all the questions of the Far East in one bite," he opened up a Pandora's box of controversy about the procedure the United States could or should follow in meeting the "peace offensive" of the U.S.S.R.

In the past it is the Russians who have taken the view that peace, at least as they would define it, is indivisible: that it is impossible, for

example, to settle the problem of Korea without at the same time discussing the future of Formosa, the admission of the Peiping regime to represent China in the United Nations, and the position of Japan in the overall picture of the Far East. American spokesmen, by contrast, have been inclined to think in terms of one step at a time, each creating an atmosphere favorable to the next, until, presumably, peace would be achieved all around the globe. The Eisenhower Administration, however, has in-

creasingly stressed the interdependence of at least some areas of conflict, pointing out, for example, that a truce in Korea might merely facilitate increased pressure by the Chinese Communists on Indochina and Malaya.

Politically Hot Issues

Yet so far there has been no official indication from Washington that an international, or even regional, "one bite" conference might be held by the interested nations. The only

exception to this has been the agreement arrived at in Panmunjom, before the truce negotiations reached a stalemate last autumn, that the conclusion of a Korean truce would be followed within 90 days by a conference on political issues. These issues, as seen by realistic observers, could not be limited to Korea but would have to touch the domestically hot questions of what to do about Chiang Kai-shek, how to dispose of Formosa, whether the United States will recognize Peiping, and whether Japan should rearm and be allowed to trade with mainland China.

In his address of April 16 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, which was widely hailed abroad and brought only mild criticisms from the U.S.S.R., President Eisenhower did not refer to any of these questions, whose discussion today, as demonstrated by Senator William H. Knowland's reaction to John Foster Dulles' "trial balloon" about a United Nations trusteeship over Formosa, might bring about a sharp split among Republicans. The President said only that the first step toward peace must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea. This, he added, "means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea. It should mean—no less importantly—an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud."

Several students of Asian affairs, however, were prompt to point out that the unification of Korea, no matter how desirable it might be from the point of view of Dr. Syngman Rhee, president of the Republic of South Korea (who insists that his government, without the need for

elections, represents all of Korea), and from that of the United Nations, would hardly be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. and Communist China unless the other problems of the Far East are tackled at the same time. To this view the President seemed to give some support when he said that "we seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total"—for the term "total" could hardly be interpreted as limited only to Korea.

In Europe the President, like Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson before him, placed a treaty with Austria at the top of the agenda. He also spoke of pressing forward with present plans for the creation of a broader free European community which would include "a free and united Germany," and spoke about "the full independence of the East European nations," without, however, referring to "liberation."

Here again some questions have been raised by experts on European problems. Is it possible to have an Austrian peace treaty until both we and the Russians know what will happen in Germany? If Germany is reunited, and we insist on the withdrawal of Russian troops from East Germany, won't the Russians insist on the withdrawal also of the five American divisions now stationed in West Germany, and what then should be done to defend German territory? And how do we envisage the "full independence" of the East European nations? If it spells the return of anti-Russian governments, do we expect Moscow to accept the creation of probably hostile regimes along the border of the U.S.S.R.? And how much independence will there be for the small nations of that area, which for centuries have been pawns of neighboring great powers, between an industrialized Russia, on the one hand, and a rapidly reviving and

possibly reunited Germany on the other, unless some new formula is devised to give them international protection against fresh encroachments from either side?

The Soviet government is aware of the domestic problems which a frank discussion of German unity and of the future of the two Chinas—Peiping and Formosa—would create for the United States. This was made clear by *Pravda's* long editorial of April 25 commenting on President Eisenhower's speech of April 16. Even if we should refrain, for reasons of domestic politics, from discussing these issues here, it would not be realistic for us to expect that other nations in the non-Communist world will observe the same reticence.

The April 23 meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council in Paris revealed that although the NATO countries see no fundamental change in Soviet policy, they no longer feel the same urgency to arm for a showdown in the immediate future as they did a year ago. The United States itself set the pattern for a more leisurely approach to rearmament by indicating, in advance of the NATO meeting, that our policy now is to arm for the long pull—perhaps 20 years—rather than for a given "crisis" year, as in the past, and to encourage a "stretch out."

The question now facing the United States and Western Europe is whether EDC, in the form now contemplated, would survive the reunification of Germany or whether we should promptly start thinking about an alternative form of defense for Europe, such as the creation of an international army combining NATO and EDC and the integration of such an army into the framework of the United Nations, on the model of the UN force now fighting in Korea.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Thompson

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sequently, the domestic pressure brought to bear upon the government to "prevent Burma from becoming a second Korea" mounted to an irresistible level. Premier Nu, who in mid-February 1953 had made a speech warmly defending the American aid program, within three weeks felt compelled to call for its termination and to charge the Formosa regime with aggression against his country. This sudden about-face had at least the merit of making the American government finally aware of how deeply the Burmese resented and feared the presence of foreign troops on their soil, and of the need to get the Formosa authorities to withdraw them. Reportedly, the Thai government was willing to have them evacuated through Thailand, provided the Burmese agreed first to disarm them.

The role played by Formosa has been ambiguous. The KMT government has consistently denied the Burmese charge that it issued directives to Li Mi and has maintained that his army (composed of "national salvation heroes") is in Burma contrary to its wishes. Obviously the Formosa regime does not want to withdraw its troops, who are already strategically poised for an attack on the homeland, and it is quite possible

that it could not compel those troops to carry out an order to evacuate Burma. Although Nationalist China's delegate to the UN continues to deny his government's responsibility in the matter, some progress has recently been made. On April 17 he pledged that Generalissimo Chiang, in conformity with Burma's wishes, would exercise what influence he possessed over Li Mi—the reports of whose death appear to have been grossly exaggerated.

It is possible that a speedy evacuation of the Nationalist troops would lead Burma to withdraw its charges against the Formosa regime and reassure the Burmese public sufficiently to permit the government to revive the American aid program, perhaps under another name. The Burmese government is obviously reluctant to take any step that might make Burma a bone of contention between the Anglo-American and Communist powers. The West, for its part, has every interest in keeping the Communists from using Burma's case as bait for the Arab-Asian bloc and as a means of alienating that bloc from the West.

(Virginia Thompson, an expert on South Asian affairs, has, as coauthor with her husband, Richard Adloff, contributed articles to *The Far Eastern Survey*, *Pacific Affairs* and other periodicals, as well as a chapter on Malaya in *The State of Asia*, New York, Knopf, 1951.)

Newsletter

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merated in this Constitution or any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."

A more concise resolution with essentially the same provisions was introduced by Senator Arthur V. Watkins, Republican of Utah, on February 16. The Senate Judiciary Committee has held hearings on the two resolutions. Approval of one of them by two-thirds of the Senate and three-fourths of the 48 states within seven years would amend the treaty clause of the Constitution.

The amendment resolutions are significant because one or the other is sponsored by 64 Senators, enough to assure passage in the Senate. Eight of these supporters are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire, Robert A. Taft of Ohio, William Langer of North Dakota, Homer Ferguson of Michigan, William F. Knowland of California and Guy Gillette of Iowa (the only Democrat in the group). The sponsors of the amendments include 18 Democrats and 46 Republicans altogether.

BLAIR-BOLLES

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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